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The Chechen-Russian Conflict: The Spiral of Hostilities 
The present military intervention in 
Qlechnya has been explained by some 
analysts by the economic competition 
over the control of oil, while other ana- 
lysts have drawn attention to the 
religious nature of the conflict. While 
bearing a kernel of truth, both ap- 
proaches are reductionist. In this 
article I will attempt to explain the 
present eruption of hostilities as the 
result of both past and present failures 
to address the conflict that has its roots 
in the military conquest of the 
Caucasus. 
In ethnic conflict studies there is an 
on-going debate between those who 
argue that in any poly-ethnic society 
conflict between groups or repression 
of one or several ethnic groups is inevi- 
table and those who suggest that it is 
possible to find a formula that would 
allow various ethnic groups to coexist 
peacefully, sharing access to power 
and economic resources, in spite of 
their cultural differences. The former, 
known as the 'plural society theorists' 
(Fumival1967, Smith 1971), affirm that 
stable democratic societies are impos- 
sible in poly-ethnic states and that 
unity in such societies can be sustained 
only by force. Others, like Ryan (1990), 
for instance, criticize this approach for 
several reasons: it ignores the possible 
existence of crosscutting cleavages be- 
tween ethnic group; it ignores the fluid 
and changing nature of ethnic identifi- 
cation; and it leaves out the possibility 
of the creation of formal rules of mu- 
tual accommodation (Ryan 1990,12- 
13). Instead, a number of authors have 
attempted to suggest a model for con- 
flict regulation between ethnic groups 
living in the same society (Ryan 1990, 
McGarry and O'Leary 1993). 
With respect to the Chechen- 
Russian conflict, it would be easy to 
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argue that the Chechen 'national char- 
acter' and aspirations are incompatible 
with the Russian ones. Indeed, this ar- 
gument is exploited by leaders on both 
sides of the conflict. Yet, the present 
conflict is a direct result of the failure to 
find accommodation acceptable for 
both parties, and unless the current 
government reverses the policy trend 
it inherited from both the pre- 
Revolutionary and the Soviet govern- 
ment, Chechnya will always remain an 
explosive area. More specifically, I 
suggest in this article that the present 
conflict is a cumulative result of hostile 
policies pursued by the Russian gov- 
ernment vis-8-vis the Chechens for 
over a century. Among these are the 
following: first, ruthless suppression 
of every uprising with no attempt to 
negotiate a settlement; second, dec- 
ades of political repression; third, 
forced relocation and poor record of 
reintegration; fourth, forced assimila- 
tion; fifth, failure to recognize de- 
mands formulated by Chechen 
separatists and negotiate a settlement 
with them; and sixth, escalation of hos- 
tilities due to war-related cruelty 
The Conquest and Resistance 
Since the 16th century Russian Czars 
undertook several attempts to incor- 
porate the North Caucasus into Russia, 
at times through peaceful means (such 
as intermarriage) but mostly by means 
of military campaigns. North Cauca- 
sian peoples resisted these attempts 
fiercely (Avtorkhanov 1992; 149-50). 
In 1859, after twenty-five years of gue- 
rilla warfare, led by Imam Shamil in 
the Chechen mountains, the Russian 
rule was nevertheless established 
(Akiner 1983,176). Yet, the Caucasians 
made every attempt to overthrow this 
foreign rule. In 1864, fearing new re- 
volts in the Caucasus, the Russian gov- 
ernment exiled masses of Chechens (as 
well as other Caucasian peoples) to 
Turkey. But thismeasure didnot prove 
sufficient and in 1877 a popular upris- 
ing flared up in Chechnya and Dagh- 
estan. The revolt was ruthlessly 
suppressed (Avtorkhanov 1992, 150- 
51). Thus started the upward spiral of 
uprisings, followed by retaliation by 
the Russian and then the Soviet gov- 
ernments. 
Uprisings and Suppression 
The Soviets assumed control in the 
Chechen territory at the end of 1917. 
Then the territory was occupied by the 
White Army and in 1920 the Soviets 
reoccupied it once again. In August 
1920, an anti-Soviet uprising flared up 
in the mountains of Chechnya, Ingush- 
etia and Daghestan, and lasted for one 
year. This uprising was crushed and 
the Chechen Soviet autonomous re- 
gion was created on November 20, 
1922 (Avtorkhanov 1992, 153-56). 
General disarmament followed. 
Yet, it did not prevent another up- 
rising in the Fall of 1929, when the in- 
surgents occupied all the rural and 
regional institutions, burned official 
archives, and arrested the staff of the 
regional government, demanding 
autonomy (Avtorkhanov 1992, 156- 
58). In the middle of December 1929, 
regular detachments of the Red Army 
began to arrive and after several 
months of fierce fighting with heavy 
losses, the uprising was once again 
suppressed. Yet peasant revolts 
continued with regularity throughout 
the 1930s .(Avtorkhanov 1992, 165). 
Some 'mullahs' and 'nationalists,' who 
had been excluded from the village by 
the Soviets in 1937, went into the 
mountains and in early 1940, Khasan 
Israilov proclaimed the 'war of libera- 
tion' and appointed a'temporary revo- 
lutionary people's government of 
Chechnya and Ingushetia.! They 
fought for a 'free Caucasus' and they 
managed to control several regions in 
the mountains until 1942 (Simon 1991, 
202-3). 
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Polltical Repression 
Political repression was also used by 
Soviet authorities against Chechen 
leaders as a preventative measure to 
intimidate and control them 
(Avtorkhanov 1992,165-71). It culmi- 
nated on July 28, 1937, when Stalin's 
Security Police representative in the 
Caucasus gave instructions to the as- 
sembled Party leaders to start a 
'super-purge.' As a result, 14,000 peo- 
ple (or one in thirty) in the 
Chechen-Ingush republic were either 
arrested and executed or deported 
(Simon 1991,202-3). Arrests continued 
until November 1938 (Avtorkhanov 
1992,176). 
Deportation 
Even though the majority of Chechens 
opposed the Germans (Akiner 1983, 
176), collaboration with the Nazi occu- 
defeat (Avtorkhanov 192, 180). Fur- 
thermore, the Soviet government ac- 
cused the Chdens  (as well as other 
Caucasian peoples) of collaboration 
with the Germans, even though the 
Chechen territory was never under 
Welumacht occupation (Simon 1991, 
202). In February 1944, the Red Army 
arrested masses of Chechens, many of 
whom were executed without trial 
(Avtorkhanov 1992,185). The alleged 
collaboration was used by the Soviet 
government to deport some 408,000 
Chechens to compulsory settlements 
in Central Asia and Siberia in March 
1944 (Simon 1991,201). Chechens were 
the most numerous of the deported 
Caucasian peoples. Simon (1991,202) 
observes that deportation was a policy 
aimed at breaking this region's 
long-lasting anti-Soviet and national 
resistance, which had triggered sev- 
eral armed rebellions. After the depor- 
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piers was used as an excuse to deport 
over four hundred thousand Chechens 
to Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Dur- 
ing the Second World War Chechen 
soldiers experienced tremendous dif- 
ficulties in the Russian Army both be- 
cause they often did not understand 
Russian and because their dietary pro- 
hibitions were not respected. Mass 
desertions by the Chechens from the 
Red Army can be attributed to these 
difficulties. Eventually, neither 
Chechens nor the Ingush were ac- 
cepted into the Red Army and those 
already serving were dismissed. How- 
ever, two divisions of volunteers from 
the Chechen-Ingush Republic were 
formed, but these were not officially 
recognized nor supplied with tanks 
and artillery. Being poorly equipped, 
the divisions found it difficult to resist 
the Germans advancing towards 
Stalingrad. Even though the entire 
southern front collapsed, the Chechen- 
Ingush population was blamed for the 
tation of the Chechen and Ingush, the 
names of towns, villages and regions 
changed and Russians and members of 
other ethnic groups were allowed to 
settle there (Simon 1991,203). 
In the 1950s, Caucasian people 
started returning to their villages, and 
the Khrushchev government that was 
in power did not place any explicit 
obstruction. By the Summer of 1954, 
many Caucasian people perceived that 
the government was relaxing its con- 
trol, and thousands of families, mostly 
Chechen and Ingush, began their move 
home. Even though some arrests and 
compulsory transport back to Central 
Asia followed, the number of 
Chechens and Ingush returning to the 
Caucasus continued increasing, reach- 
ing a total of 25,000 to 30,000 by 1956. 
On November 24, 1956, the Central 
Committee issued a decree reinstitut- 
ing the right of the deported peoples to 
return. In January 1957, the 
Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic was mestablished, 
and between 1957 and 1- they were 
allowed to return (Simon 1991, 241- 
43). 
Although the authorities promised 
the returning people credit, housing 
and work, the re-integration of repatri- 
ated people proceeded at a very slow 
pace. The return of the Chechens and 
Ingush caused the gravest and most 
lasting tensions. Housing and employ- 
ment were insufficient, partly because 
many more families returned to the 
homelands than the plan had antici- 
pated. Tensions grew between the re- 
turning Chechens and the Russians 
who had settled in their villages and 
cities. From August 24 to 28, 1958, 
Groznyi witnessed great disturbances 
between the Chechen, Ingush and Rus- 
sian populations. Troops were 
brought in to re-establish order and 
peace. The government did not try any 
Russian instigators for the distur- 
bances but placed the blame entirely 
on Chechen and Ingush 'bourgeois na- 
tionalism' (Simon 1991,243-44). 
Forced Assimilation Policies and 
Resistance 
The Soviet government adopted poli- 
cies of forced assimilation of the Cau- 
casian people, but in spite of their 
attempts, both the clan system and 
militant Sufi brotherhood survived 
well into the Soviet rule. Many clans 
kept land in their possession, although 
the Soviets labelled it as kolkhoz 
(Simon 1991, 202; Akiner 1983, 176). 
The deportation of Chechens to Cen- 
tral Asia reinforced both the Sufism 
and the clan system (Simon 1991,348). 
Religion and kinship were employed 
to sustain solidarity of the deported 
people (Bennigsen Broxup 1992a, 7-8). 
After the repatriation, the Soviet au- 
thorities once again tried to suppress 
the Chechen culture: Chechens were 
not allowed to teach their languages at 
school, to have mass-media in their 
language or to engage in any ethnic 
cultural activities (Simon 1991, 243). 
All mosques were closed until 1978 
(Bennigsen Broxup 1992a, 7). Still, their 
religion proved to be resilient and to- 
day about 150,000 to 200,000 people are 
- - - 
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members in the Sufi brotherhood in of the Chechen Congress included free 
Chechno-Ingushetia. The Sufi brother- elections, and a new constitution and 
hood enjoys as much prestige as it did citizenship law. It insisted on the need 
before the Revolution (Bennigsen for a peace treaty between Russia and 
Broxup 1992a, 7-8). 
Stereotyping 
~hechnya preceded by an uncondir 
tional recoation of the right of the 
Chechen people to sovereignty, trial of 
As far back as 1834, a Russian civil those guhy bf genocide igainst the 
servant described the Chechens as a Chechen nation, payment of compen- 
nation 'remarkable for her love of sation for crimes against thenation and 
plunder, robbery and murder, for her the return of national patrimony. After 
spirit of deceit, her courage, reckless- the failure of the coup, on August 22, 
These atrocities only reinforce attitudes of hostility, 
suspicion and even hatred, that had existed on both sides before 
the armed conflict started. The escalation of violence makes it 
even more di@cult for the two sides to find common grounds. In 
the atmosphere of heightened negative emotions, it would be 
nearly impossible to adopt measures needed for the process of 
peace building to begin. 
ness, resolution, cruelty, fearlessness, 
her uncontrollable insolence and un- 
limited arrogance.' And he proposed 
that "they only way to deal with this 
ill-intentioned people is to destroy it to 
the last' (cited in Bemigsen Broxup 
1992a, 10). Similarly today, Chechens 
are frequently portrayed as 'crimi- 
nals,' 'Mafia,' 'drug traffickers' and 
'armed bandits' (York 1995a) and cer- 
tain measures have been taken by Rus- 
sian authorities to harass and deport 
Chechens living in Moscow (GAry 
1993, Caplin 1993, York 199%). 
Failure to Recognize Chechen's 
Political Aspirations 
The National Chechen Congress held 
an inaugural meeting on 23-25 No- 
vember 1990, in Gromyi. On Novem- 
ber 27, under pressure from the 
Congress, the Chechen-Ingush Su- 
preme Soviet proclaimed the Repub- 
lic's sovereignty. At that time, the 
ambitions of the movement were mod- 
erate; namely to raise the state of their 
regihn from autonomous to federal 
republic which would enable them to 
sign a union treaty with the USSR. By 
June 1991, their position became more 
radical. General Dzhokhar Dudaev, 
the chairman of the National Congress, 
expressed full support for the disinte- 
gration of the Soviet Union. Demands 
1991, the Chechen opposition de- 
manded the resignation of the local 
government and new elections 
(Bennigsen Broxup 1992b, 85-87). 
None of these demands were accepted 
by Russia. Since August 1991, Moscow 
tried persistently to vilify the Chechen 
opposition and to distract attention 
from the main issue expressed by 
Dudaev. Moscow responded by or- 
ganizing counter-rallies, letters to 
Moscow newspapers complaining 
about the 'undemocratic' and 'uncon- 
stitutional' behaviour of the national 
Chechen Congress, encouraging the 
warlike ambitions of the Cossack colo- 
nies, painting the opposition as 'ban- 
dits' and 'criminals' and by military 
threats. 
Nevertheless, on October 27, 1991, 
Dudaev was elected president of 
Chechnya by an overwhelming major- 
ity (Bennigsen Broxup 1992b, 231-35). 
Since then, Moscow's attempt to dis- 
credit Dudaev and his supporters 
grew only stronger. Unsuccessful in 
their efforts to depose Dudaev from his 
post and to quench separatist aspira- 
tions, the Russian Army invaded 
Chechnya on December 11,1995. 
Escalation of Violence 
Once the war started, atrocities were 
committed by both sides. Russian sol- 
diers have been accused of routine vio- 
lations of basic rights, including beat- 
ing, torturing and killing civilians, 
looting and vandalizing their prop- 
erty, and setting the reign of terror in 
parts of Chechnya brought under their 
control. On the other hand, Russian 
soldiers justify the mistreatment of 
Chechens as retaliation for the atro- 
cious way in which Russian prisoners 
were treated by the Chechens in the 
first days of this year. Dozens of cap- 
tured Russian soldiers were tortured, 
mutilated and publicly executed. Lo- 
cal Russians were not allowed to bury 
the bodies abandoned in the streets 
(Gallagher 1995). These atrocities only 
reinforce attitudes of hostility, suspi- 
cion and even hatred, that had existed 
on both sides before the armed conflict 
started. The escalation of violence 
makes it even more difficult for the two 
sides to find common grounds. In the 
atmosphere of heightened negative 
emotions, it would be nearly impossi- 
ble to adopt measures needed for the 
process of peace building to begin. 
In sum, the eruption of violence that 
we witness today in Chechnya has its 
roots in the conquest of the Caucasus 
by Russia in the mid-nineteenth cen- 
tury. Since then, relations between 
Chechnya and Russia have been char- 
acterized by a never-ending spiral of 
hostilities which the Russian govern- 
ment had tried to regulate only by he- 
gemonic means, such as suppression, 
political repression, and deportation. 
In addition, the Soviet authorities have 
tried to destroy Chechen culture, reli- 
gion and traditions. In response, the 
Chechens have continued their resist- 
ance, both at the cultural and at the 
political level, never having submitted 
themselves to the Russian rule. 
Once again,they tried to free them- 
selves of Russian control and once 
again, Moscow cracked down by using 
excessive violence. Once it started, it 
led to escalation on both sides of the 
conflict. Until Moscow recognizes the 
legitimacy of some of the concerns 
raised by Chechen people and at- 
tempts to negotiate their demands, 
more blood will be shed on the 
Chechen land, 
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